North High School Wall of Honor
Russell Edward Reel
Class of January, 1943
1943: Russell Edward Reel
Research done by Claradell Shedd, Class of 1953.
Russell Edward Reel
Russ was a member of North High's class of January, 1943. His next of kin was listed as Mr. Russell J. Reel, 3927 11th Street Place, Des Moines, IA. Russ's service number was 37661848.
Russell Edward Reel
Year   Rank   Status
January, 1943   x   Graduated from North High, Des Moines, IA
February 17, 1943   Drafted;
US Army
  Camp Dodge, IA. Battery D, 749th AAA
date x US Army/PVT x Basic Training at *Camp Pendleton, VA
July 16, 1943 x US Army x To NY, Alexandria
July 17, 1943-August 3, 1943 x Enroute x From NY; Arrived in Reykjavik, Iceland. Photo with group below taken May 13, 1944 in Iceland.
June 20, 1944-
June 31, 1944
x US Army x Left Iceland and arrived in Scotland.
July 28, 1944 x US Army/
Enroute
x Arrived in Wales. There for three days.
August 21, 1944 x US Army/
Enroute
x Arrived in Southhampton
August 23, 1944 x Enroute x Arrived in France
August 25, 1944 x Enroute x ***Arrived in Normandy, France. 1st Army, 3rd Army, 9th Army
September 11, 1944 x Enroute x Arrived in **Liege, Belgium.
September 13, 1944 x Enroute x To Holland. Then back to Belgium..
Sept. 10, 1944-
January 10, 1945
x Stationed x

In Belgium from September 10, 1944 to January 10, 1945.

March 10, 1945
x Stationed x Weisbaden, Germany (around Frankfurt).
October 18, 1945 x Stationed x Left Weisbaden, Germany for 3rd Army Reinforcement; Marburg, Germany, for 17 days.
November 5, 1945 x Stationed x Antwerp, Belgium. Then transport to NY. Very big storm on ocean for two days. Train to IA. Then to TX. Then to IA.
Nov. 19, 1945-
Dec. 1, 1945
x Enroute x From Antwerp, Belgium to NY on ship transport. Very big storm on ocean for two days.
December 6, 1945 x Discharged/PFC x Camp Grant, IL
1945-1952 x Employment x In Des Moines area.
1952-2010 x Employment x Owned La Pizza Restaurant for 58 years. Closed August 3, 2010.

*Camp Pendleton, VA
Camp Pendleton, in Virginia Beach, was established in 1912 on the Atlantic Ocean beach, just south of Rudee Inlet, as a rifle range for the state militia. Between 1922-1942, it was renamed after the current governor of Virginia - Camp Trinkle, Camp Byrd, etc. The current name honors Brig. Gen. William Nelson Pendleton, an Episcopalian minister at Grace Church in Lexington who served as Robert E. Lee's chief of artillery during the Civil War.

During World War 1 and World War II, the base was Federalized. The Navy preferred Camp Pendleton over Fort Eustis for coastal artillery training in World War I, because the artillery could shoot over the undeveloped Atlantic Ocean waterfront without worrying about objections by landowners on the "receiving" end. (Later, as the area developed, landowners did object...) The Army controlled the facility in World War II, and applied the Camp Pendleton name.

**Liege, Belgium
The Germans returned in 1940, this time taking the forts in only three days. Most Jews were saved, with the help of the sympathising population, as many Jewish children and refugees were hidden in the numerous monasteries. The German occupiers were expelled by the United States Army in September 1944 but Liège was subsequently subjected to intense aerial bombardment, with more than 1,500 V1 and V2 missiles landing in the city between its liberation and the end of the war.


***Artillery
In World War I the artillery arm of the U.S. Army had fought in Europe equipped entirely with French or British weapons. There were many reasons for this: the need to standardize Allied arms, lack of shipping space, and lack of industrial capacity. However, another factor was that many ordnance specialists in Britain and France felt that the indigenous American gun designs were not up to European standards. As a result, in 1921 the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Charles P. Sommerall (one of the most brilliant artillerymen in U.S. Army history) established the Westervelt Board to examine the army's ordnance requirements for the future. The board's report was impartial and farsighted, and it had dramatic consequences for the U.S. Army artillery in World War II. The board recommended that the standard divisional artillery piece be increased in caliber from 75mm to 105mm, while the general support weapon for the division was to be standardized as the 155mm howitzer. The 4.7" corps general support gun (a British design) was to be discarded in favor of the 155mm gun (a French design). In addition, the board recommended that heavier pieces of the most modern type be designed, and that all artillery pieces be suitable for rapid motorized road movement. Finally, improvements in fire control methodology and communications were recommended, based upon concepts that had been pioneered by Summerall as an artillery brigade commander in France.

The financial climate of the 1920s and 1930s delayed the deployment of such an improved artillery system. However, sufficient funding was available to allow innovative Artillery and Ordnance officers to continue experimenting with new gun designs and doctrine. As a result, when the Army began to expand, much of the background work to modernize the artillery was already complete. Designs had been completed and prototypes developed and tested for most of the guns and howitzers that were to see service during the war (the opposite of the situation in the new Armor Branch, where prohibitive cost had stymied design work on armored vehicle prototypes and doctrinal experimentation during the 1920s and 1930s).

Divisional pieces included the M1 105mm howitzer and the M1 155mm howitzer. Both were excellent weapons, with good range and, particularly in the case of the 155mm, excellent accuracy. Other new weapons were the M1 75mm pack howitzer and the M3 105mm howitzer. Both were lightweight and could be easily broken down into manageable loads suitable for transportation by pack animal (horse, mule, or man as available) or by air, and if relatively short-ranged, were ideal for airborne forces. The M3 also saw service after 1943 in the Cannon Company of the infantry regiment. A SP version of the M1 105mm, the M7 Priest, also equipped the field artillery battalions of the armor division.

Non-divisional artillery pieces included battalions equipped with these same weapons, as well as other, heavier pieces. A companion of the 155mm howitzer was the 4.5" gun (an indigenous 120mm gun was one of the few failures of the inter-war design projects). The tube of this gun was of British design, while the carriage was that of the 155mm howitzer (carriage commonality between companion guns and howitzers was one of the hallmarks of U.S. artillery designs). Unfortunately, the 4.5" -- although well liked by American artillerymen - was not a very efficient weapon for its size. The shell (also of British design) was of low-grade steel, thick-walled and with a small bursting charge compared to the shell weight. The 4.5" projectile weighed 54.90 pounds, but had only a 4.49 pound bursting charge, while the 105mm howitzer projectile weighed 33 pounds, but had a 4.8 pound bursting charge. Its range was insufficient to compensate for the relative ineffectiveness of this round and as a result it was withdrawn from service soon after the end of the war.

A much more effective weapon was the M1 155mm gun, known as a "Long Tom" (an appellation with a long and glorious tradition in the U.S. artillery.) It combined long range, accuracy, and hitting power with a well designed, mobile carriage.

A different 155mm gun was the M12 SP. Developed in 1942, it was an interesting amalgam of the old and the new, utilizing the tube of the pre-war French designed GPF (Grand Puissance, Failloux), itself developed in World War II, and the chassis of the obsolescent M3 Grant tank. It was an experiment by the Ordnance Department that had been turned down by the AGF in October 1943 on the grounds that there was no requirement for it. However, in early 1944 urgent requests from U.S. Army forces in England for a heavy SP gun resulted in 74 being rebuilt. They eventually equipped seven field artillery battalions in the ETO and proved invaluable. An improved model, the M40, based upon the M1 gun and M4 tank, was produced in 1944 and deployed in limited numbers to the ETO in March 1945.

Heavier supporting artillery pieces were the M1 8" howitzer, an excellent and accurate weapon; the M1 8" gun, which was developed as an answer to the superb German 17cm gun, had greater range and a more lethal shell than the German weapon, but suffered from poor accuracy and excessive barrel wear; and the 240mm howitzer, a good, if very heavy, weapon.

Nearly all US artillery battalions were organized with three firing batteries and a total of twelve tubes. The exception was the eighteen-tube armored field artillery battalion and the six-tube 8" gun and 240mm howitzer battalions. A major advantage for the American artillery was that it was fully motorized and highly mobile. All 105mm and 155mm howitzer battalions in the ETO were truck-drawn, although a Table of Equipment (TE) for a tractor-drawn 155mm battalion existed. The 155mm gun battalions were almost all tractor-drawn, although a few evidently were also truck-drawn. The 4.5" gun, 8" gun, 8" howitzer, and 240mm howitzer battalions were all tractor-drawn, although, again, a TE for truck drawn battalions existed. The standard prime mover was a two-and-one-half ton truck for the 105mm and a 4-ton Diamond T truck for the 155mm howitzers. Tractors included the M5 thirteen-ton prime movers, which were utilized for the 105mm M2 howitzer, the 4.5" gun, and 155mm M1 howitzer, and the M4 eighteen-ton hi-speed, full-track, heavy prime mover, which was utilized for the 3" AA gun, the 90mm AA gun, the 155mm Long Tom gun, 8" howitzer, 8" gun, and 240mm howitzer. Redundant M3 medium tank chassis, without armament, and M31 and M32 armored recovery vehicles were also utilized as prime movers for the heavier artillery pieces.

Non-divisional artillery battalions were normally subordinated to field artillery groups. The groups were formed in 1943 from the headquarters battery of the broken up field artillery regiments. The field artillery group consisted of an H&H Battery, with a command element and a fire-direction center element, and a Service Battery. A group was usually assigned from two to six battalions, although one or more of the battalions might be attached for direct support of an individual division. Usually, the groups were assigned howitzer and gun battalions of companion caliber, that is, 155mm howitzers were grouped with 4.5" guns, 8" howitzers with 155mm guns, and 8" guns with 240mm howitzers. The normal ratio was one gun battalion for every two howitzer battalions, although this was not always firmly adhered to. Separate 105mm howitzer battalions were normally grouped together, but were almost always assigned to direct support of divisions. The 155mm SP gun battalions were assigned to groups as the tactical situation warranted, or were frequently attached, by battery or battalion, to armored or infantry divisions.

Field artillery brigades were also created, originally to command the separate field artillery regiments and later, to command the field artillery groups. However, the brigade eventually was seen as a redundant and unnecessary additional layer of command. Most of the brigades were inactivated or were redesignated as H&H batteries and assigned to different corps and divisions. A few artillery brigades were retained and served as such, the 13th in the MTO and the 32nd, 33rd, 34th, and 61st in the ETO. In the First Army in the ETO, two field artillery groups were attached to the 32nd Field Artillery Brigade. The brigade controlled all 8" gun and 240mm howitzer battalions of the army, making it, in effect, a heavy artillery brigade. A similar, but less centralized system was followed by Third, Seventh, and Ninth armies for control of their heavy battalions.

All in all, the U.S. artillery was equipped with armament that was at least as well designed as, if not better than, any other in the world. The U.S. artillery further benefited from communications equipment and a fire control system that was equaled only by that of the Royal Artillery. Individual forward observers operated close to the front lines and had access, via powerful radios and extensive telephone landlines, to a formidable array of weapons. The highly redundant signals system meant that, even when all other contact with front-line units and their headquarters was lost, the artillery communications net usually remained open.

Perhaps more important, and making the U.S. artillery the best in the world, was a fire-direction system that had been develop at the U.S. Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, between the wars. This was a highly refined development of the crude system Summerall had pioneered in World War I. This system permitted rapid engagements of targets, and allowed the coordination of fires of many units from many widely separated firing positions. One of the most deadly tactics employed was the time-on-target (TOT) concentration. A TOT massed fires from several battalions onto a selected target and calculated the times of flight for the shells from each battery so that they all arrived on target at nearly the same instant (a similar tactic, called a "Stonk", had been developed independently by the Royal Artillery in North Africa).

Further enhancing the deadliness of the U.S. artillery was the development and deployment in the ETO in December 1944 of the new proximity fuse. Also known by its code designation of VT (for variable-time) or POZIT, the proximity fuse contained a tiny radar that triggered detonation at a preset distance from a solid object. The POZIT fuse had been intended for use against air targets (taking a heavy toll of German "Buzzbombs" in the fall of 1944). The fuse significantly simplified and enhanced the lethality of air bursts and eliminated the need for complicated and unreliable time fuses.

Although US artillery was second to none in the war, problems with ammunition supply did hamper efficiency at various periods. This problem reached its nadir during the fall of 1944, when the US artillery in Europe was reduced to strict rationing of ammunition. At one point, the artillery was limited to fewer than twenty 105mm rounds-per-day-per-gun. From 11 October to 7 November 1944, Third Army fired a total of 76,325 rounds of all types (an average of 2,726 per-day), which was less than the number fired on a single day during the Battle of the Bulge. Indeed, at the end of the Battle of the Bulge, ammunition reserves in the ETO were 31 percent of the War Department's planning levels (which were already conceded to be too low). Like the personnel replacement problem, the ammunition shortage was only truly solved by the ending of the war.

Initially, the troop basis allotted by the AGF for non-divisional artillery was somewhat low, and it emphasized lighter artillery over heavier. Only fifty-four heavy and eighty-one medium battalions, compared to 105 light battalions, were authorized on 24 November 1942. However, lobbying by Generals McNair and Sommervell in 1943 resulted in an increase. On 15 January 1944 the War Department authorization had expanded to include 111 heavy and 111 medium battalions, while the number of light battalions authorized had decreased to 95. In April 1944 a review of combat experience by the Lucas Board resulted in a further expansion, with 143 heavy and 114 medium battalions authorized on 1 July 1944. Converting light artillery battalions made up most of the increased numbers, by 1 July the authorized number of light battalions was down to eighty. On 31 December 1944 the artillery reached its maximum strength. On that date there were a total of 346 battalions active, 137 heavy, 116 medium, and 93 light. On 31 March 1945 there were 137 heavy, 113 medium and 76 light battalions active, of which 307 were deployed or were about to deploy to active theaters of war.

Although US artillery was second to none in the war, problems with ammunition supply did hamper efficiency at various periods. This problem reached its nadir during the fall of 1944, when the US artillery in Europe was reduced to strict rationing of ammunition. At one point, the artillery was limited to fewer than twenty 105mm rounds-per-day-per-gun. From 11 October to 7 November 1944, Third Army fired a total of 76,325 rounds of all types (an average of 2,726 per-day), which was less than the number fired on a single day during the Battle of the Bulge. Indeed, at the end of the Battle of the Bulge, ammunition reserves in the ETO were 31 percent of the War Department's planning levels (which were already conceded to be too low). Like the personnel replacement problem, the ammunition shortage was only truly solved by the ending of the war.

Initially, the troop basis allotted by the AGF for non-divisional artillery was somewhat low, and it emphasized lighter artillery over heavier. Only fifty-four heavy and eighty-one medium battalions, compared to 105 light battalions, were authorized on 24 November 1942. However, lobbying by Generals McNair and Sommervell in 1943 resulted in an increase. On 15 January 1944 the War Department authorization had expanded to include 111 heavy and 111 medium battalions, while the number of light battalions authorized had decreased to 95. In April 1944 a review of combat experience by the Lucas Board resulted in a further expansion, with 143 heavy and 114 medium battalions authorized on 1 July 1944. Converting light artillery battalions made up most of the increased numbers, by 1 July the authorized number of light battalions was down to eighty. On 31 December 1944 the artillery reached its maximum strength. On that date there were a total of 346 battalions active, 137 heavy, 116 medium, and 93 light. On 31 March 1945 there were 137 heavy, 113 medium and 76 light battalions active, of which 307 were deployed or were about to deploy to active theaters of war.

As of 8 May 1945 there were a total of 238 separate field artillery battalions in the ETO, including:
As of 8 August 1945 there were a total of fifty-three separate field artillery battalions in the PTO, including:
Seven 8" howitzer battalions:
The 465th, 655th, 749th, 750th, 786th, 789th, and 797th;

Russell Reel with Army buddies; 1945 1945

US Army Seal


AntiAircraft Artillery Patch

Russell Edward Reel
PFC
Instrument Observer 578
Battery D, 749th AAA Gun Bn
US Army


Russell Edward Reel


1st Army Patch

Patton's 3rd Army Patch

Simpson's 9th Army Patch/Rhineland

WWII Victory; European-African-Middle Eastern Theater w/4 Bronze Battle Stars; Good Conduct, Sharpshooter Medal/Rifle


WWII Victory Medal; European-African-Middle Eastern Theater w/4 Bronze Battle Stars for
Northern France, Rhineland, Central Europe, andGround Combat;
Good Conduct Medal; Sharpshooter Medal/Rifle
References
(1) The World War II Army Enlistment Records contain information on more than nine million indivdual enlistments. These records can be found online at http://www.archives.gov/.

(2) The comprehensive list of names from North High's 1893-2018 graduation classes are from Claradell Shedd's North Des Moines High School website. The names of North High School graduates can be found online at: http://www.ndmhs.com/. Russell Edward Reel's 1943 class page is: http://www.ndmhs.com/pages/yearclass1943(2008.65).html.
8/30/10. Living in Des Moines, IA. Died: 12/01/13.
Music: "Wind Beneath My Wings"
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